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T
his year marks the centenar y of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and this 
symposium is one of the events to commemorate the occasion in France. This short 
piece revisits the Japanese peace conference policy in the light of its involvement in 
the First world War. 
During the First World War, Japan was engaged in three main military expeditions. First, 
Japan declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914, which resulted in the joint expedition with 
the local British force to occupy the German concessions on the Shandong Peninsula, to capture 
Qingdao where the German East Asiatic Squadron, the largest concentration of German navy 
outside of Europe, was based.1 The Jiaozhou (Kiaochow) Bay by 1909 had become the second 
largest commercial port in China after Tianjin. In this battle, Japan mobilised nearly 52,000 troops, 
*  This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Asia and Europe from 
the Versailles Treaty to the Present: The Legacies of Post War-Endings and Peace-making between 
Constraints and Forward Looking” held by JIIA and FRS (Foundation for Strategic Research)on Jan. 28, 
2019.
**  Naoko Shimazu DPhil (Oxon), FRHist.S, is Professor of Humanities (History) and Associate Dean 
of Faculty at Yale-NUS College, and Professor at the Asia Research Institute, National University of 
Singapore.
1 Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol.I: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 447.
Abstract
The military engagements during the First World War earned Japan a seat as a victor at 
the Paris Peace Conference, as the fifth great power, after the United States (as the first 
superpower), Britain, France, and Italy. At the peace conference, Japan made three peace 
demands. The rst two were territorial in nature. The racial equality proposal—the third 
Japanese peace term―became the most hotly debated peace topic in Japanese public debate 
during the peace conference in 1919. What is important to remember is that racial politics 
played a significant part in some of the politico-military calculations made by the Allied 
powers. The Japanese sensitivity to what they regarded as discriminatory treatment of Japan 
and Japanese nationals surfaced as a formal peace term at the Paris Peace Conference, 
and became known as the racial equality proposal. In reecting on the issues raised by the 
Japanese at the Paris Peace Conference on its centenary, one is struck by the continuity in 
terms of the issues that matter―such as racial politics and immigration―in international 
relations today. Moreover, the continued relevance also of the nation-state as the basic unit 
of international relations in the early twenty-rst century global affairs remains strong, in 
spite of the rapid increase in many non-state actors. No doubt, we continue to deepen our 
historical understanding of the Paris Peace Conference, hopefully, in ways which may not 
have been imaginable hitherto.
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Britain 870 troops, in addition to about 450 Indian troops.2 Although it may have appeared like a 
neat little manoeuvring to gain a foothold in China on the peninsula in proximity to Tianjin and 
Beijing, the Japanese move backred later at the peace conference when Japan’s successful claim 
to have the German rights in Shandong transferred to Japan, caused a diplomatic furore with the 
United States and China. This came as a complete surprise to the Japanese who expected the 
transfer to be conferred without a question based on the secret agreements signed with Britain, 
France, Italy and Russia before the Chinese entered war in August 1917. Ultimately China refused 
to sign the treaty, and this whole episode ignites the May Fourth Movement in China. In the end, 
Japan had agreed to return Shandong to China at the Washington Conferences of 1921–1922.3
The second military expedition pertained to the Japanese occupation of the German islands 
in Micronesia (Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas) the north of the equator, which the Japanese 
Second South Seas Squadron had managed to complete by 14 October 1914. The outbreak of the 
war had set off a mini-scramble for German territories in the Pacic―and in this New Zealand 
had led the way by occupying Samoa by 30 August, followed by the Australian occupation of 
German New Guinea and the Solomon Islands by 15 September. On the surface, the Japanese 
conquest of the Micronesian Islands might have come across as a costly enterprise, which 
primarily helped to boost Japan’s fragile ego as the newest great power, a belated Japanese bid 
for the late nineteenth-century Western scramble for the Pacic of the late 1890s. Nevertheless, 
from the geopolitical point of view, the success of this naval expedition could be considered as the 
most signicant gain by Japan during the war, because it helped to substantiate the geopolitical 
imaginations of Japan’s future as a significant Pacific power, in the way that Japan’s previous 
imperial wars had not been able to do. The occupation of the Micronesian Islands, given as class 
“C” mandates at the Paris Peace Conference, had turned the Japanese presence in the Central 
Pacic as a semi-permanent geopolitical reality. If one looks as the map of the Asia-Pacic, one can 
see the “Arc” of the Japanese empire coming substantially down into the Central Pacic, stopping 
just at the equator, above Papua New Guinea. It does not require a great leap of imagination to see 
that the perimeter defence of Japan’s wartime empire in the rst one hundred days after the Pearl 
Harbor, followed that same “Arc” except that it was expanded by being pushed landwards into the 
Southeast Asian territories of the British, French and Dutch colonial empires. 
Moreover, our understanding of the significance of the Japanese occupation of Micronesia 
is enhanced through adopting a global historical perspective. In Japanese historiography, the 
Japanese occupation of the Micronesian islands is generally treated as a minor colonial issue 
relative to the larger Taiwan, Korea and the Liaodong Peninsula, with the exception of naval 
history. Recent scholarship has focused on Micronesia as part of Japan’s League of Nations 
diplomacy.4 What may have appeared to be a symbolic expansion into the southern Pacic from 
the Japanese perspective, came to assume much graver practical implications for the British 
Dominions, and the defence of the British Empire in the post-1919 world.5 According to the 
Australian House of Representatives debate on the peace treaty in September 1919: “Australia has 
taken its frontiers northward to Rabaul, but the frontiers of Japan has been brought southward 
2  Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Fukugosenso to soryokusen no danso: Nihon ni totteno daiichiji sekai taisen (Kyoto: 
Jinbun shoin, 2011), 57.
3  Bruce A. Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2002) sheds new light on the complex issue of the Shandong Question, which questions the 
orthodox interpretation of the “wronged China” view.
4  Tōmatsu Haruo, Nihon teikoku to inin tōchi: Nanyō guntō o meguru kokusai seiji, 1914-1947 (Nagoya: 
Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2011). 
5  For instance, Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol.1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 481-483.
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3,000 miles to the equator, until their front door and our backdoor almost adjoin.”6 Arguably, 
therefore, the signicance of the Japanese naval expansion southward was felt most keenly, not 
by the Japanese themselves, but Australia and New Zealand whose heightened sense of threat 
contributed to hardening the perception of Japan’s new role as a Pacic power.7 Ultimately, the 
Japanese expansion into the Pacic during the First World War can be regarded as setting out a 
preliminary “blueprint” for what later became the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
The third military expedition was politically and diplomatically the most fraught, on the 
question of a joint Allied expedition to Siberia in 1918. Japan had been asked to send 7,000 troops 
to make up the Allied intervention, and responded to it by mobilizing 73,000 troops. The Japanese 
decision took place under a hawkish prime minister, General Terauchi, whose government falled 
due to the Rice Riots of 1918, only to be replaced by the moderate, pro-Western prime minister, 
Takashi Hara. (The Japanese navy also sent warships to the Mediterranean to defend Allied 
shipping in 1917.) The Siberian troop deployment, like the Shandong occupation, became a thorn 
in the Allied camp. 
The militar y engagements above earned Japan a seat as a victor at the Paris Peace 
Conference, as the fifth great power, after the United States (as the first superpower), Britain, 
France, and Italy in that order of hierarchy of great powers. The story of Japan’s participation at 
the peace conference underlines difculties the Japanese faced in having to operate for the rst 
time as a major power in a multilateral framework of international diplomacy. 
At the peace conference, Japan made three peace demands. The first two were territorial 
in nature, emanating from the military victories made against the former German concessions 
and territories held in Shandong and the Central Pacic. The Japanese government had signed 
a series of secret treaties in 1917 with the key states to secure these territories, and hence, was 
taken aback when the question of the retrocession of Shandong to China was raised at the peace 
conference. In some sense, the cost to Japan for obtaining Shandong at Paris, albeit temporarily, 
was the racial equality proposal―the third Japanese peace term, which became the most hotly 
debated peace topic in Japanese public debate during the peace conference in 1919. The failure 
of the racial equality proposal became symbolic of the failure or the weakness of Japanese peace 
diplomacy, and incurred a substantial cost to the Foreign Ministry in terms of its reputation. 
Strictly speaking, however, foreign policy decision-making was not made in the Foreign Ministry 
at the time as it had been taken over by a transcendental body called the Diplomatic Advisory 
Council, in which the Foreign Ministry ofcials played a relatively minor role.
What is important to remember is that racial politics played a significant part in some of 
the politico-military calculations made by the Allied powers. Japan as the only non-white great 
power on the Allied side, was distrusted in particular by the United States. Racial tensions 
particularly between Japan and the United States reached its peak in 1913 with the passing of the 
Californian Alien Land Law. In fact, the tension was such that President Wilson had discussed 
with the cabinet the mobilisation of the eet in the Pacic in preparation for a possible conict 
against Japan.8 Although Britain had to contend with anti-Japanese sentiment expressed by its 
Dominions, especially Australia, it did not overshadow the British military decisions vis-à-vis the 
Japanese during the First World War. In fact, Britain was often put in an awkward position having 
to appease the stringent anti-Japanese sentiment held by the Americans which derived not only 
6  “Between the wars,” Chapter 1, http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/pdf/RCDIG1070314--1-.
PDF, accessed 5 January 2014.
7  Neville Meaney, Australia and World Crisis, 1914-1923: A History of Australian Defence and Foreign 
Policy 1901-23: Volume 2 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009).
8  Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge, 
1998), 76. This book still stands as the most comprehensive treatment of Japan’s participation at the 
Paris Peace Conference, and in particular, the racial equality proposal, to date.
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from their distrust of the Japanese, but also from their support of the newly found “Young China.” 
Moreover, the highly expansionist Twenty-One Demands of 1915 which attempted to turn China 
into a semi-colony of Japan, had exacerbated the bad will which had already existed between 
Japan and the United States. Therefore, even with regards to the Siberian intervention, the 
American opposition to the Japanese troop deployment which had been pressed by both Britain 
and France, was not only due to geopolitical concerns, namely that the Japanese troops might use 
this as a pretext to station troops in the region east of Lake Baikal. But, I have argued elsewhere 
that “the American government was principally concerned about the effects of Japanese troop 
deployment on American domestic opinion” seeing that it had been deeply sensitised with 
the anti-Japanese immigration policy as well as by the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 against 
China.9 Sir William Wiseman summed up the underlying American sentiment: “The American 
hatred of all yellow races is thinly, if at all, disguised. Any thought of the yellows being brought 
in to redress the balance of the whites is repugnant to them, especially when it may involve the 
consequent loss of commercial advantages in the new and lucrative mark of East Russia.”10 In fact, 
the Japanese sensitivity to what they regarded as discriminatory treatment of Japan and Japanese 
nationals surfaced as a formal peace term at the Paris Peace Conference, and became known as 
the racial equality proposal as mentioned above.
In reflecting on the issues raised by the Japanese at the Paris Peace Conference on its 
centenary, one is struck by the continuity in terms of the issues that matter in international 
relations today. Particularly, the relevance of issues such as racial politics, and immigration, is 
striking, to say the least. Moreover, the continued relevance also of the nation-state as the basic 
unit of international relations in the early twenty-first century global affairs remains strong, in 
spite of the rapid increase in many non-state actors. In any case, the centennial years have given 
rise to a swathe of new scholarship and the dominant trend can be dened as the “global turn.” 
And, in these new globally-led narratives, the Japanese participation as one of the great powers 
plays a prominent role in anchoring the globality of the war itself. And, with this global turn, we 
begin to see exciting new historical insights unravelling in the centenary of the peace conference, 
such as Japan’s involvement in the Catholic network of informal diplomacy.11 No doubt, we 
continue to deepen our historical understanding of the Paris Peace Conference, hopefully, in ways 
which may not have been imaginable hitherto. 
9  There is a notable new research on the topic of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 by Naraoka Sochi, 
Taika niju-ikkajo yokyu to wa nani dattanoka: Daiichiji sekai taisen to nicchu tairitsu no genten (Nagoya: 
Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2015).
10 As quoted in Shimazu, Japan, 109.
11  Patrick Houlihan’s unpublished paper “The Other Admiral Yamamoto: Catholic Globalism at the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919,” presented at an international conference on The Paris Peace Conference 
and the Challenge of a New World Order, German Historical Institute, Paris, June 2019.
